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Panorama of Presentations 
1) Introduction via a future space of integration 
One of the 201h century's most important legacies is likely to be the greatest public space the 
world has ever known - 'cyberspace', home to the Internet, whose most popular feature is the 
aptly named World Wide Web that was developed by CERN in Europe. The Internet itself 
was devised by the US Defence Department some 30 years ago and has since spread all over 
the globe. From a nuclear attack-resistant method of exchanging information - and military 
intelligence - it has become a public space spanning continents and remained open, so far, to 
anyone with a personal computer and a telephone line. 
However, for all the superlatives which it has attracted, the Internet is simply one of the many 
public spaces generated in the second half of the 201h century. Ordinary citizens are joining 
forces across national borders over a wide range of public issues, in non-governmental 
organisations (NGO's) such as Friends of the Earth, Amnesty International and Medecins 
sans Frontieres. At the same time, in some parts of this inter-connected world governments 
are trying to redefine their political space. The largest and most comprehensive of the 
regional groupings, based on a pooling of national sovereignty, however, is the 15-nation 
European Union (EU), which even now is preparing to add new members. Across the 
Eurasian landmass, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region have set up their economic co-
operation forum with the Americans, APEC. Other regional organisations in Asia are the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association of 
Regional Co-operation (SAARC). 
What is driving people to generate new public spaces and nations to seek to co-operate with 
each other regionally and even globally? What do their organisations have in common? And 
can they learn from each other? There clearly is a need for a dialogue between Europeans and 
Asians, on their respective efforts at co-operation and integration. It is all the more 
significant that the seminar which is the subject of this volume should have been organised by 
the Forward Studies Unit, the think tank of the European Commission, the EU's executive 
arm, in co-operation with the Institute for the Integrated Studies of Future Generations in 
Kyoto. At a time when Europe is still Eurocentric, the seminar offered a chance to dialogue, 
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and to engage in a mutual learning process, as Wolf gang Pape, one of the European 
organisers, reminded his audience. His Asian counterpart, Tae-Chang Kim, noted that the 
seminar offered an opportunity to see what Japan, China and Korea can learn from the EU in 
their efforts at generating transnational public spaces, on the way to their eventual regional 
integration. 
2) Japanese views on integration: From Kant to EU 
For Naoshi Yamawaki the birth of the EU was an "epoch-making event, from which all 
countries have much to learn". It was born at a time when the dominant social thinking of the 
2oth century was becoming increasingly obsolete, making it imperative to create new 
viewpoints in order to overcome the human as well as social crises of our time. The question 
he set himself, in fact, was how transnational or intercultural public philosophy should be 
developed between the EU and the countries of East Asia, given the very different situations 
that prevailed in Europe, on the one hand, and Japan on the other after World War II. 
Historic experiences of total war forced France and Germany in particular to construct a 
transnational public space, work on which still continues. In Japan, however, the country's 
intellectuals have sought to replace the individual as an Imperial subject under the "Tenno" 
system, with the individual as representing a modem nation. Even liberal political 
philosophers (imperial system) have stressed the importance of a "sound nationalism''. 
Because of this, and the complex political situation in China and Korea resulting from the 
cold war, building a transnational public space in East Asia has proved to be extremely 
difficult. 
The construction of a transnational and intercultural public space in East Asia remains one of 
the very important tasks facing the countries in the region, for Naoshi Yamawaki. But the 
task can only be undertaken in the light of the formation of a situation of nation-state in Japan 
and China - in order not only to replace the former feudal system but also to compete with 
Western colonialism, in Japan's case, and to fight it in the case of China. But in the present 
post-colonial era it is important to create a concept of public space that goes beyond the 
nation-state. And to this end it is necessary to take up the very different concepts of 
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transnational or intercultural public space developed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and 
Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803). 
Kant defined public space as a transnational space which, although constituted by world 
citizens, did not amount to an all-embracing, imperialistic world state. Indeed, he defended 
the policies of China and Japan against European power politics. Herder's public space, 
however, was anti-universalistic and multicultural. He believed that mankind does not live in 
an abstract universal space but in many separate cultural spaces, largely marked by different 
languages. For Y amawaki, the ideas of Kant and Herder should not be seen in opposition to 
each other, but from the viewpoint of "multiple understanding of self'. 
He therefore introduced the concept of "cosmopolitan self', which Kant renewed. While the 
cosmopolitan self sees other beings in a universalistic way, this notion of it must be combined 
with other public dimensions of Understanding of Self, which are characterised by cultural-
historical differences. Self thus possesses a unique history, depending on whether the person 
in question is Japanese, Chinese, Korean - or German or Belgian. This individual must make 
the effort to understand others who live in different cultures. Thus the universalistic 
viewpoint of Cosmopolitan Self and the multicultural viewpoint of Particular Self 
complement each other, in order to create the desired transnational and intercultural public 
space. 
The translation of this public philosophy into an East Asian public space requires a 
comparative study of European and East Asian philosophies, according to Y amawaki. It is 
very important that Asian people study the forgotten or ignored intellectual heritage of 
European thought, while Europeans uncover the similarly forgotten or ignored intellectual 
heritage of Asian thought. Both Asians and Europeans in fact would benefit from a study of 
Spinoza and Leibniz, while it is important that non-Asians understand the various 
philosophical traditions of East Asia, such as Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. In this 
way "we may finally co-construct a transnational public philosophy not only in Europe but 
also in East Asia". 
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a) Public sphere transcending borders 
N aoshi Y amawaki was not alone in turning to European thinkers for help in generating 
transnational public space in East Asia. Tatsuro Hanada turned to Jurgen Habermas for help 
in answering his own question; "Can a public space transcend national boundaries?" He 
placed his question in the context of two developments which began in the 1980s: an 
intellectual movement that is currently probing the relationship of the state to the public, on 
the one hand, and of the global market to the public on the other, and the impact of 
information/communication technology on society. State and market are seen today not as 
two separate problems but as one set of issues. Opposition to such critical questioning has 
manifested itself in the form of a renewed and strengthened belief in the nation-state and 
capitalist free market. 
For Hanada the term public sphere is more significant than public space. Thus parks and 
streets are public spaces, but are not in themselves the public sphere. But what is the concept 
of the public sphere? It is a normative historical concept developed by Habermas in his work 
"The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society," first published in 1962. For Habermas, modernity was formed from the 
development of a division between state and society, or rather the development of a split 
between the "sphere of public authority" and the "private sphere" during the collapse of the 
feudal system. The emergent bourgeoisie assumed control of the private sphere. While the 
economic social relations of bourgeois society were recast into the market economy, the 
literary public sphere (composed of coffee-houses, salons and clubs) became politicised and 
was transformed into a political public sphere. The bourgeoisie used the cause of freedom of 
speech as a strategy for achieving their interests, marking the origin of equating freedom of 
expression with free markets. 
Hanada' s reading of Habermas leads him to rephrase his question, so that it becomes, "Can a 
public space transcend the framework of nation-state?" The nation-state is a modern 
invention which combines the nation and state together in one set. Its territory substantiates 
the existence of the national state. The legitimacy to rule the interior is the basis of 
sovereignty, and the people within form the unified nation. As for the public sphere, like the 
market, it has been constrained within the concept of the nation-state. Just as the medium of 
the market is money, the medium of the public sphere is the national or official language. In 
8 
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other words, the nation-state was built on the foundation of the geographic formation of the 
national market and the national public sphere. 
But what is the relevance of these conceptual considerations to actual solutions for North-East 
Asian countries? For Hanada, it is necessary to untie the unit of nation and state, and then to 
replace nation with the public sphere. The state should be rebuilt in this way into an 
institution guaranteeing democratic political procedures. The potential of the public sphere 
can be realised through an active private sphere, as happened in the Gdansk shipyard in 
Poland and the Nikolai church in Leipzig, East Germany. The public sphere was constructed 
here in the course of the East European revolutions of the late 1980s. But the reality, as 
Hanada notes, is that the framework of the nation-state has been strengthened in each country 
of North-East Asia, though their economic links have expanded through the market. Because 
of a lack of the political, the private sphere is connecting itself more to the market place and 
less to the public sphere, according to Hanada. 
b) Barriers to integration in East Asia 
But how effective are prescriptions based on the concepts of 181h century German 
philosophers or the analysis of contemporary German social theorists likely to prove when 
applied to present-day North-East Asia? Yuzo Mizoguchi, like Naoshi Yamawaki, is 
concerned by the failure of East Asian nations, particularly China, Japan and Korea, to 
establish a modern integration mechanism. He points out that throughout the past 1,000 years 
these three countries have maintained close cultural, and therefore economic, relations. 
Mizoguchi, like Y amawaki, points to a number of political barriers. He, too, notes that 
Japan's failure to come fully to terms with its war guilt has resulted in the continuing mistrust 
of the Chinese and Korean people and governments. But political barriers have often been 
overcome through economic relations; thus Taiwan's exports to Mainland China are 
flourishing, despite their tense political relationship. 
It is not politics, therefore, but the "barriers to intellectual culture" between the three East 
Asian countries which are preventing them from establishing an integration mechanism. The 
origins of these barriers are historic. When Asian countries opened their ports to trade with 
the West, they also opened their doors to Western culture, taking Western values and 
civilisation as standards against which to judge their own cultures. The differences in the 
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speed and outcome of the modernisation of Japan and China should have been viewed in the 
light of the differences in their traditional societies; instead they were perceived in terms of 
how quickly or slowly the two countries adopted modem European ways - and of the 
superiority of the one over the other. 
The "W estem impact", in other words, both severed the cultural links between the East Asian 
countries and imposed on them the superiority/inferiority view of history in place of the 
different but equal view. The precondition to creating a modem integration mechanism, 
therefore, is to generate a shared intellectual public space between China, Japan and Korea, by 
concentrating on their 1,000-year-old shared intellectual culture. This has begun to happen in 
the last three years between intellectuals in these three countries, according to Mizoguchi, and 
the fruits of their activity are beginning to appear in the leading journals. An intellectual 
public space has been established and, taking advantage of the Asian discovery of itself, will 
continue to expand rapidly. Even so it is too soon to say how and when a political or 
economic integration mechanism will take shape.Mizoguchi stated that he would like 
intellectual culture to serve as the basis of an integration mechanism. 
3) Integrating communities: European views 
Gwyn Prins also favoured cultural drivers of integration, although of a very different kind. 
He saw integration as "a community of interests that is internally driven and is continuously 
reproduced". Because the individual perceives integration, public space only exists because it 
contains a multitude of private spaces. Top-down ways of creating public space are fear-
based and require lots of negative energy. They are therefore unsuccessful, and Prins felt one 
should be suspicious where large-scale integration, backed by public statute, seems to have 
occurred - as in the EU. A better way is using positive energy to create a "moral 
community". This implies a willingness to take actions that are apparently against one's 
interest - economic, for example - in order to maintain the moral community. 
With the frontiers between public and private space becoming increasingly blurred today, 
Prins saw at least two sorts of modem integration. He described the first as residual/passive, 
marked by abstentionism. He thought it interesting mainly because of its functional nature: it 
makes travel easier, for example, and is the equivalent of a supermarket - useful and 
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convenient, even if somewhat more expensive. The second is focused on social beliefs, and is 
energised social space, in which people share symbols, myths and rituals, and can have power 
structures, organisational structures and control systems. Its introspective version is 
represented by football clubs, hobby groups and cybergangs, bonding against their enemies. 
The extrovert version is represented by members of Greenpeace and the International Red 
Cross, for example, who voluntarily come together, across national boundaries, in the face of 
shared threats, thus creating virtual communities of obligation. 
Prins saw some individuals defending universal values. Did they exist? Hisonori Isomura 
thought not. Prins was less categorical. Like Y amawaki he turned to Kant, namely to the 
German philosopher's categorical imperative, to treat humanity not as a means but always as 
an end. 
When opening the seminar which his Institute had helped organise, Kim Tae-Chang had 
described the two basic issues under discussion as regional integration and generating global 
public space. The highly theoretical nature of the discussion on public space suggested that 
the East Asian countries lag some ways behind the European in the construction of public 
spaces, whether at the local, national or transnational level. This relative absence of public 
spaces in East Asia may well be due to cultural differences, or the continuing existence of the 
East Asian tradition of a strong state and a weak society. 
The discussion on models of integration also threw into sharp relief the differences between 
Europe and East Asia, even while highlighting the obstacles that lie in the way of regional 
integration in Asia, particularly along European lines. As several speakers pointed out, 
regional organisations in Asia, such as APEC and ASEAN, are forums for discussion and co-
operation~ "we are far from the pooling of sovereignty", which remains a feature of the 15-
nation European Union. 
Johan Galtung had set the stage for discussion by defining some of the key terms. He saw 
integration as "the alignment of culture, economy and political and military power," with the 
emphasis on shared history and culture (in the form of a shared secondary language at least, 
for example). For alignment to succeed, there must be a common cultural base that facilitates 
mutual understanding, an economic complementarity that will make the steps from free trade 
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ally and a bastion against Communism, even releasing the A-ranked war criminal, Kishi 
Nobosuke, from prison and making him Prime Minister. Meanwhile, the rise of nationalism, 
of the Japan that can say no, has obscured the problem of the country's war guilt. Indeed, the 
fact that Japan follows the American line on Taiwan exacerbates the ill feeling of the 
Mainland Chinese towards Japan. 
Young Kwan Yoon turned to two competing theoretical explanations of the European 
integration process to assess their implications for East Asian integration. The institutionalist 
explanation emphasises the supranational aspects of the integration process, these being the 
supranational institutions and their directors. Thus the 1992 single market project was 
possible largely because of the alliance between the president of the EC Commission and 
European supranational firms. The intergovernmentalist explanation emphasises the 
importance of intergovernmental bargaining in the integration process. It sees the EC as a 
network involving the pooling of sovereignty, and puts intergovernmental bargaining at the 
centre of the analysis of the EC's integration process. Such bargaining, especially between 
Germany and France, was the decisive factor which related such domestic factors as the 
significant changes in French economic policy in 1983, to the adoption of the 1992 project. 
The role of the Council of Ministers is more important, therefore, than that of the European 
Commission. 
For Yoon the implications for East Asia are considerable. European governments began to 
deregulate the private sector and resort to more market-oriented policies. Similar convergence 
in economic policies among East Asian countries will be a precondition for any significant 
integration that might occur. Given that both the average level of government intervention in 
the market is higher, and the divergence in the degree of intervention is greater among East 
Asian countries, economic integration will require further economic liberalisation and policy 
convergence in East Asia. Indeed, given Japan's importance for the region, it would need to 
liberalise its economy urgently. 
At the same time, given that intergovernmental bargaining is still important in the European 
integration process, such bargaining will be even more important in East Asia, where the 
tradition of a strong state and weak society still prevails. This means that East Asian 
countries will have to be careful in adopting the post-modernist approach, which emphasises 
the role of non-state actors, to the issue of East Asian integration. In other words, inter-
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national politics will continue to be the most important factor in the future integration process 
in East Asia. It will therefore be necessary to remove historical misunderstandings and 
animosities, and to establish a closer relationship between China and Japan, as happened 
between Germany and France after World War II. 
Markku Heiskanen also tried to examine developments in a theoretical framework. He used 
the theory of strategic culture, which introduces a historical dimension to international 
relations theory. It stresses the importance of ideas and beliefs held by state elites rather than 
states as rational actors, which cannot help but seek to maximise utility gains for themselves. 
The strategic culture of North-East Asia places a premium on the utility of military power, 
and on the importance of maintaining a balance of power. This is because inter-state tensions 
are very marked in North-East Asia, particularly when compared to South-East Asia. The 
North-East Asians have a long history of war and aggression, both within the region and with 
outside powers. All these experiences have left deep imprints on the national psyches of 
North-East Asians. Against this background, Heiskanen pointed out, the North-East Asian 
neo-realist atmosphere does not seem to offer the same preconditions for the development of 
regionalism, not to speak of integration, as in South-East Asia, where states behave in a more 
co-operative way. 
b) China's bilateral ism changing with economic growth 
Given that China is a key player in the region, its attitude towards integration can have a 
decisive impact on regional developments. The changes in China's approach to Asian 
regionalism were explored by Xinning Song. His starting point was historical - the closed, 
centralised kingdom, lasting for thousands of years, that was ancient China. It was the centre 
of the world and other countries, including the West, were dependencies. Indeed, the 
relationship between China and the outside world was that of the monarch to his subjects. 
Co-operation with others could not be on a basis of equality, and integration could only mean 
bringing neighbouring countries under Chinese rule . 
However, by the time the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1 949, China had 
undergone a century of humiliation. Although a member of the Socialist camp, it was more 
concerned with safeguarding its own sovereignty and independence when it signed a treaty of 
alliance with the Soviet Union in 1950. And when moves towards Asian regionalism began 
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to surface in the 1960s, China stayed aloof, from a fear that any regional or multilateral 
arrangement could have a negative impact on the country's sovereignty and independence. 
But China's response was also based on its history: it saw itself as the most important power 
in world politics - the centre of world revolution in the 1960s, for example - and therefore 
above mere regional arrangements. 
But there were also practical considerations, according to Song. Asian regionalism, the 
Chinese felt, would help Japan establish its hegemony in East Asia, given China's economic 
weakness. Regional arrangements would make it more difficult for China to deal with the 
ASEAN countries, particularly over issues relating to the South China seas. Finally, any 
regional arrangement in Asia would be unworkable without American participation. It was 
much better for China to deal bilaterally with the US, given that Japan and the ASEAN 
countries tended to follow America's lead. 
Chinese attitudes to Asian regionalism began to change markedly in the early 1990s, with the 
realisation that regionalisation of the global economy had become an irreversible trend. The 
major dynamics of Chinese support for, and growing interest in, regionalism came from 
economic, political and security reasons, both domestic and external. The phased opening of 
the domestic economy to the international market led to rapid development along China's 
coast, characterised by the emergence of growth triangles or "economic circles". One such 
circle linked Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan Island to Hong Kong and Macao. A cross-
strait economic area has evolved between Taiwan and the mainland's south-east coastal 
provinces, while in North China, Shandong province and South Korea are developing the 
Yellow Sea economic circle. At the same time cross-border trade with the Russian Far East 
and the Central Asian republics is growing fast. 
While bilateralism is the traditional Chinese approach to political and economic co-operation 
in the Asia-Pacific region, there has been "a slow but steady perceptual and behavioural 
change in its multilateral diplomacy," especially since the end of the Cold War. Even so, the 
official position is that regional multilateral arrangements should not be the only solution, as 
they alone cannot address the variety and difficulty of issues and forces involved. Thus 
regional co-operation in Asia-Pacific should not be as integrated and centralised as that in 
Europe. Co-operation, in fact should be multilevel also; thus sub-regional arrangements, such 
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the Malaysian prime minister's East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), could undermine 
possible Japanese or American dominance. 
The process of economic co-operation has brought China's economic and preference 
structures closer to those of the regional capitalist economies. Yet the same process also 
generates yearnings for protecting sovereignty and national identity. Its imperial past requires 
China to extend its presence beyond the region. Indeed, these contradictory forces have 
resulted in a high degree of uncertainty and fluctuation that set significant limitations on 
China's "learning" to co-operate. If all goes well, by 2020, the APEC free trade deadline, the 
combined economic strength of the China economic area (Mainland China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan) should equal that of the present EU and NAFT A. It will be in a position to take a 
leading role in organising the Asia-Pacific regional political economy, according to Xinning 
Song. 
China's experience only confirms that East Asia is the most dynamic area of the world in 
terms of economic performance, according to S. Mansoob Murshed. Successful integration 
into the globalised marketplace cannot occur without a successful growth experience in the 
first place. This in turn cannot occur without a major part played by the state in determining 
strategic economic policy. East Asian success has been traditionally attributed to more 
nations in that region pursuing more open policies, which they adopted earlier than others did 
elsewhere. Growth promotes aspects of openness, which implies less protectionism and the 
absence of a bias against more outward-looking economic development. It marks the path to 
integration. 
5) Social value added in Europe and institutions required in Asia 
Since nobody would fall in love with the integration of a common market, the Europeans had 
to add other integrative dimensions, according to Magnus Ekengren. That is why since its 
beginning, European integration encompassed for instance also a social dimension. This 
dimension has been slowly developed, trying to reach a balance -albeit uneasy-- between 
national competencies and the need for common action at Community level. Different 
methods have thus been used, from inter-governmental to supranational approaches. 
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Whilst the new role of -especially international-- NGO's in civil society is increasing also in 
Asia, traditional politics will remain of crucial importance. From the Korean point of view on 
Asian integration, there is a need for some kind of strong institutional mechanism. But the 
Japanese seem not yet to be ready to assume leadership, whereas China still opposes such • 
regional institutions. However, with the end of the Cold War and the re-shaping of strategies 
all over the world, Korea fears being left alone in a strategic vacuum and it wants to prepare 
for a future scenario where other powers might withdraw commitments made under Cold War 
conditions. 
For some Europeans, this Korean perspective looked like "deja vu" in view of the 
preparations under way for the EU' s enlargement to its Central and Eastern European 
neighbours. But also here the debate is in full swing: "How can we generate a public space for 
our common futures?" 
M. Subhan, G. Guallar, W. Pape; Brussels 
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